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Earning Deference: Reflections on the
Merger of Environmental and Land-Use Law
MICHAEL A.LAN WOLF*
The bedrock notion that courts should, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, defer to lawmakers is currently under attack in
the nation's courts, commentary and classrooms. Leading the way
are several United States Supreme Court Justices who, in cases
involving the Commerce Clause,' the Takings Clause 2 and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,3 are much more willing than
their immediate predecessors to second-guess the motives and tac-
tics of elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. 4
Given this new juris-political reality, it is more important
than ever that local government officials-who are often (though,
certainly, not always justifiably) viewed as occupying the bottom
rungs of the ladder of governmental competence-take special
care when operating beyond the scope of their "traditional" regula-
tory tasks. Local environmental law, the focus of this very timely
symposium, is perhaps the most important area in which local of-
ficials are stretching beyond their conventional roles. The pur-
pose of this paper is not to urge the prohibition of these
regulations, for doing so would run contrary to my commitment to
a more healthy environment for humans and other animals and
* Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond. The author thanks
Mary Heen for her perceptive suggestions and John Nolon and his colleagues at Pace
University School of Law for presenting the opportunity to participate in this provoca-
tive symposium.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XJV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
4. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review,
54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 91 (2001) ("[L]egislative record review demonstrates judicial sus-
picion of congressional motives.").
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living things.5 Instead, I wish to offer a caveat to local elected and
appointed officials, as well as, the counsel who advise these impor-
tant actors in the land development and preservation drama, re-
garding the "nature and extent"6 of environmentally flavored local
regulatory activities. This caveat can be simply expressed, "before
implementing, applying or enforcing local environmental law,
make sure that you can demonstrate that you have earned
deference."
I. In the Comfort Zone
For more than eight decades, zoning and land-use planning
have been located squarely within the "comfort zone" of local gov-
ernment. Indeed, it has been an unshaken principle of American
constitutional jurisprudence since 1926 that local governments
are entitled to generous deference when exercising their tradi-
tional police powers, including zoning and planning. In that year,
Associate Justice George Sutherland somewhat surprisingly
wrote the following sentence for a six-member majority of a Court
that to this day carries a reputation for striking down regulations
affecting property and contract rights: "the village, though physi-
cally a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality,
with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit
within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the State
and Federal Constitutions." 7
In that same case, Sutherland and his colleagues encapsu-
lated the practice of generous, though not unlimited, deference in
two phrases that continue to pose serious problems to landowners,
developers and speculators who bring to the courtroom their chal-
lenges to zoning and planning decisions and regulatory tools.
These phrases are "fairly debatable" and "clearly arbitrary and
5. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Environmental Law Slogans for the New Millen-
nium, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10283 (Apr. 2000), reprinted and revised in 35
U. RICH. L. REV. 91 (2001).
6. The quotation marks are the author's (perhaps too-subtle) attempt to link his
cautionary message to the Court's "rough proportionality" test in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("No precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.") (emphasis added). By no means, however, is the author unqualifiedly endors-
ing the Court's more exacting test. See Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the
"Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and
Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996).
7. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
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unreasonable." "If the validity of the legislative classification for
zoning purposes be fairly debatable," the Euclid opinion reads,
"the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."9 A few
pages later, Sutherland noted that the reasons proffered by the
local government need "not demonstrate the wisdom or sound pol-
icy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated as
pertinent to the inquiry."10 What was required was much less on-
erous: "the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from
saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."'
Two years later, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,'2 a unani-
mous Court found that the municipality had exceeded its constitu-
tional powers in designating part of the plaintiffs prime industrial
parcel for residential use. As the Court used the Euclid formula-
tion, it would not be accurate to say that Euclidean deference nec-
essarily means a positive outcome for local government
regulators. Still, it would be disingenuous to assert that local offi-
cials are not greatly benefited by the "fairly debatable" and
"clearly arbitrary and capricious" formulations.
Today, Euclidean zoning-regulation of land by height, use,
and area-is squarely within the comfort zone of local officials.
Indeed, zoning and education are probably the two most impor-
tant functions performed by local officials. More than eight de-
cades of experience and experimentation with zoning and
planning have produced a system of regulation that is more flexi-
ble, more responsive to changing development patterns and less
prone to corruption than was true during the formative period.
This evolution has taken place under a policy of benign neglect by
the nation's courts. Armed with their twin weapons of "fairly de-
batable" and "clearly arbitrary and capricious," local officials could
enter the legal battlefield assured of victory except in the most
egregious cases of governmental abuse and excess.' 3
8. See id.
9. Id. at 388.
10. Id. at 395.
11. Id.
12. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
13. See generally Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
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II. Going "Too Far"14
As the nation entered the latter half of the twentieth century,
local governments began to experiment with the incorporation of
environmental policies and practices into their zoning and plan-
ning schemes, a practice that soon brought them into direct con-
flict with a majority of the Supreme Court. Beginning in the late
1960s and early 1970s, environmental issues began to capture the
attention of elected officials (driven by constituent concerns and
demands) on the federal level. By the time Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981 with his "government is the problem"15 approach,
the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations contained
reams of pages devoted to the regulation of air pollution; 16 water
pollution; 17 waste treatment, transport and disposal;' 8 toxic chem-
icals;19 pesticides and other poisons; 20 ocean dumping;21 safe
drinking water;22 protection of endangered and threatened spe-
cies; 23 management of the coastal zone; 24 federal public land man-
agement;25 and releases of hazardous substances. 26 All of the
activity was not confined to the federal level, however, as activists
in states and localities successfully urged lawmakers to imple-
ment legal controls over activities that endangered our fragile eco-
logical balance.
By the close of the twentieth century, this non-federal experi-
mentation was in serious jeopardy. One legacy of the Reagan
years has proved to be a significant barrier to the growth and even
14. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) ("The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking.").
15. President Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1 (Jan. 20,
1981).
16. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
17. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
18. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (2000).
19. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
20. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(2000).
21. See Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1445 (2000).
22. See Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
23. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
24. See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000).
25. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1785 (2000).
26. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 99 9601-9675 (2000).
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continued vitality of state and local environmental activity. The
fortieth President and his successor, George Bush pdre, remade
the federal judiciary, particularly the United States Supreme
Court. One key and controversial contribution to American juris-
prudence made by the new conservative majority on the High
Court has been the reinvigoration of the Takings Clause, a move
that has posed serious problems for a wide range of environmental
regulations promulgated and enforced by local and state offi-
cials. 27 State and local floodplain controls, wetlands restrictions,
beach access easements, bicycle paths, coastal development bans,
endangered species protections, and open-space ordinances have
all been subjected to regulatory takings analysis, and some of
these regulations have fallen as a result of increased and height-
ened judicial scrutiny.
A quick review of several of the leading regulatory takings
cases reveals the tension between non-federal environmental reg-
ulation and private property rights protection by the Rehnquist
Court. For years, the Court had avoided deciding the substantive
question of whether, in fact, a regulation that went "too far" ef-
fected a taking that required compensation from the govern-
ment.28 In 1987, the new Chief Justice, writing for the Court in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les,29 answered that question affirmatively, assuming that the
challenged restriction (local floodplain controls) deprived the land-
owner "of all use of [his] property."30 A few weeks later, in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission,3 1 a five-member majority ex-
panded the reach of the regulatory takings doctrine beyond depri-
vation of value to allow for the invalidation of regulations that do
not "substantially," as opposed to "rationally" or "reasonably," ad-
vance a "legitimate state interest."32 A state coastal commission's
exaction of a beach access easement use in exchange for permit-
27. See Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of
Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2158 (2002).
28. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348
(1986). The Court could not decide whether a regulatory taking had occurred because
the local regulator had not yet made "a final and authoritative determination of the
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property." Id.
29. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
30. Id. at 321. But see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). On remand, the appellate
court found that the ordinance did not deny the landowner of "all uses." Id.
31. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
32. Id. at 834-35.
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ting beachfront construction was voided because of the lack of a
substantial connection between the ends and the means.
The regulatory takings steamroller picked up steam in 1992
when, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,33 the Court
held that "[wihere the State seeks to sustain regulation that de-
prives land of all economically beneficial use, [the State] may re-
sist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use inter-
ests were not part of his title to begin with."3 4 In 1994, regulators
received an even more significant jolt from the Justices. The ma-
jority in Dolan v. City of Tigard,3 5 built on Nollan's activist foun-
dation and obligated a local government to carry the significant
burden of demonstrating that the bicycle path and floodplain ease-
ments it had exacted from a plumbing supply business were
roughly proportional to the impact of a planned expansion of its
building.36 This was a far cry from Euclidean deference, occa-
sioned (and justified) most likely, by the majority's concern about
the motives and abilities of local regulators to craft and impose
fair environmental protection measures.
More recent cases have brought additional bad news to state
and local environmental regulators and their supporters. Five
years after Dolan, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Mon-
terey, Ltd.,37 the Court considered a case involving a frustrated
landowner's efforts to secure site plan approval for a beachfront
residential development.38 This time, there was no need to ex-
pand the substantive reach of regulatory takings; instead the
Court permitted the extremely puzzling questions of "economi-
cally viable use" and "substantially advanc[ing] a legitimate pub-
lic purpose" to be submitted to a jury.3 9 In 2001, in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,40 we learned that even landowners who maintained
a "token interest" could claim a Lucas-type total deprivation. 41
33. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
34. Id. at 1027. On remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that Lu-
cas suffered a temporary taking deserving of compensation. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal
Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
35. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
36. Id. at 391 ("rough proportionality").
37. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
38. See id. at 697-98. In this case, county officials imposed open-space require-
ments due to their concern about the impact on the critical habitat of an endangered
butterfly. Id.
39. See id. at 700-01.
40. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
41. Id. at 615-16.
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Morever, we learned that even if those landowners acquired their
ownership interest in the property with notice of existing restric-
tions, they were not necessarily foreclosed from bringing a regula-
tory takings lawsuit challenging those very regulations. 42 At risk
in Palazzolo were state controls over-filling coastal wetlands.
It is important to recite this litany because it demonstrates
quite clearly the hazards of implementing and enforcing state and
local environmental controls affecting the use of land. Although
not all non-federal regulation has been struck down in recent
years, 43 a majority of the Rehnquist Court views such restrictions
as the Achilles heel of property regulation generally, and the re-
sult has been the dramatic expansion of the judiciary's power to
strike down a wide and increasing array of regulatory work-prod-
uct by nonfederal elected and administrative officials.
Supporters of local environmental law in legislatures, agen-
cies, nongovernmental organizations and law schools can (and do)
rail against this unfortunate development. But, after the rhetori-
cal smoke clears, one stark jurisprudential reality still stands in
the way of further progress: the current Court does not believe
that state and local governments are necessarily entitled to gener-
ous deference when engaging in environmental regulation of land
use.
III. Revisiting the "Environmentalization" of Land-Use
Planning
In the mid-1990s, I first explored the mixture of land-use
planning and environmental law on the local level, 44 identifying
four major problems:
First, because there is no barrier separating land-use planning
from environmental regulation, local officials often operate in a
realm in which they have little expertise and even less control
over negative externalities. ...
Second, neoLochnerean judges can use the corruption, haphaz-
ardness, and prejudice frequently associated with local land-use
planning and zoning to rationalize greater activism in the area
42. Id. at 626-30.
43. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
202 (2002) (holding that development moratoria totaling thirty-months did not effect
per se regulatory taking).
44. See Wolf, supra note 5, at 92-109.
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of environmental regulation-at local, state, and federal levels.
Third, the state of takings jurisprudence was already confused
before Dolan and before the activism that cases such as Nollan
and Lucas inspired in the state and lower federal courts.... The
combination of Scalia's incantation of nuisance law [in Lucas45]
and Rehnquist's rethinking of judicial deference [in Dolan46
promises to make a perplexing body of law even more puzzling.
Statutes that attempt to "strengthen" private property protec-
tions ... promise to complicate the matter even further.
Fourth, decision-making in private real estate markets is frus-
trated because of the ambiguities of takings law and the merg-
ing of land-use planning and environmental law tools and
analysis. 47
These problems have only been exacerbated in the succeeding
years. First, even more localities, many inspired by the Smart
Growth movement,48 have taken on a new set of environmentally
flavored land-use regulations. There is no indication, however,
that the level of expertise has meaningfully improved across the
board, despite the efforts of the American Planning Association,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other propo-
nents of the concept.
Second, Del Monte Dunes and Palazzolo are strong evidence
that the activist judges' commitment to private property rights
protection is not waning in the least. We have even seen efforts to
expand the regulatory takings doctrine beyond its traditional real
property "moorings. '49
45. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
46. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91.
47. Wolf, supra note 5, at 78-84 (footnotes omitted).
48. See, e.g., JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LocAL LAND USE AUTHOR-
ITY TO ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH (2001); Timothy Beatley & Richard Collins, Smart
Growth and Beyond: Transitioning to a Sustainable Society, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 287
(2000).
49. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (invalidating a program that
expanded health benefits for coal mine employees and their dependents, with four
Justices finding a regulatory taking and a fifth Justice finding a violation of the Due
Process Clause); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (allowing a regu-
latory takings challenge to IOLTA program to proceed); see also Michael Allan Wolf,
Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The Perils of (Mis)reasoning by Analogy, 51
ALA. L. REV. 1355 (2000) (criticizing these and other attempts to expand regulatory
takings analysis).
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Third, the elusive regulatory takings "quark"50 is still out of
our grasp. Rather than clearing up this hopelessly confused area
of the law, the Justices have muddied the waters even further by,
for example, tampering with the "notice" defense, 51 raising ques-
tions about modes of and timing for compensation5 2 and offering
suggestive dictum regarding conceptual severance 53 and the
rough proportionality test.54 This author, like many of his col-
leagues, has found ample cause for concern regarding the Court's
sojourns in this crucial area. 55
Finally, as the sad sagas detailed in Del Monte Dunes, Palaz-
zolo, and Tahoe-Sierra so starkly testify, landowners continue to
suffer emotionally and financially from the inabilities of some en-
vironmental regulators to render a final answer regarding devel-
opment permission. As long as landowners are left hanging for
years, even decades, we will see even more judges who choose not
to indulge in Euclidean deference to environmental land-use
regulators.
50. CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE,
AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 766 (3d ed. 1976), quoted in Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 n.17 (1985); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 ("A blanket rule that purchasers with notice
have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to
accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.").
52. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1977) (considering
ripeness of a regulatory takings case involving transferable development rights).
53. Professor Margaret Jane Radin uses the phrase "conceptual severance" to de-
scribe the strategy of reducing the focus of the regulatory takings analysis to the af-
fected portion of the landowner's property. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal
Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988). See also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (citations omitted)
("Some of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory
action is measured against the value of the parcel as a whole, but we have at times
expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule, a sentiment echoed by some commen-
tators."). But see Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1483 ("Petitioner's 'conceptual severance'
argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regula-
tory takings cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.' We have consistently
rejected such an approach to the 'denominator' question."). The Tahoe-Sierra dissent-
ers were not convinced. See id. at 1496 n.* (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's
decision to embrace the 'parcel as a whole' doctrine as settled is puzzling.") (emphasis
in original).
54. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703 (Dolan's "rough-proportionality test.. .is
inapposite to a case such as this one" that is "based not on excessive exactions but on
denial of development.").
55. See, e.g., Haar & Wolf, supra note 27; Michael Allan Wolf, Pondering Palaz-
zolo: Why Do We Continue to Ask the Wrong Questions?, 32 Envtl. L. Rptr. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10367 (Mar. 2002).
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IV. The Takings Pitfalls of Smart Growth
Some of the most familiar examples of local environmental
law are identified with the Smart Growth movement. A list of ten
"Smart Growth Principles" appears in Getting To Smart Growth,5 6
a 100-plus page publication of the Smart Growth Network that
can be downloaded from EPA's Smart Growth web site:
1. Mix land uses
2. Take advantage of compact building design
3. Create a range of housing opportunities and choices
4. Create walkable neighborhoods
5. Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong
sense of place
6. Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and criti-
cal environmental areas
7. Strengthen and direct development towards existing
communities
8. Provide a variety of transportation choices
9. Make development decisions predictable, fair and cost
effective
10. Encourage community and stakeholder collaboration in
development of decisions 57
Several of these principles are consistent with the goals of Eu-
clidean zoning and can be accomplished by slight modifications of
traditional zoning ordinances, modifications that should not trig-
ger judicial skepticism. While a traditional zoning map segre-
gates land uses into residential, commercial, and industrial zones
(as well as into subcategories ), localities can implement Principle
One by creating mixed-use zones 58 or incorporating erstwhile in-
compatible uses in a planned unit development. 59 For decades,
many municipalities have been using traditional planning and
zoning powers such as Floor Area Ratio modifications 60 and park-
56. Smart Growth Network & Int'l City/County Mgmt. Ass'n, Getting to Smart
Growth: 100 Policies for Implementation, at http://www.smartgrowth.org/pdf/gettosg.
pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2002). [hereinafter Getting to Smart Growth]. The publication
is part of "an ongoing series" available on the Smart Growth Network web site. See
also DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNITY, & ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION, U.S. EPA, ENCOURAG-
ING SMART GROWTH, at http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth (last visited Mar. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter "EPA SMART GROWTH"].
57. Getting to Smart Growth, supra note 56, at ii.
58. See CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A
CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 283-84 (4th ed. 1989).
59. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 9.24-9.30 (4th ed. 1997).
60. See id. § 5.65.
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ing space controls to encourage compact building design (Principle
Two). Planners have also made real progress in the areas repre-
sented by Principles Nine and Ten, by, for example, involving citi-
zens in key comprehensive planning decisions and keeping the
public involved regarding zoning maps, procedures and changes.
Unfortunately, several of the suggested tools for accomplish-
ing other Smart Growth principles are the kinds of devices that
raise the suspicion of judges concerned with the erosion of private
property rights. For example, if localities choose to use exactions
to create or expand sidewalks, to reroute traffic, or to create parks
and greenways as ways of achieving "walkable communities"
(Principle Four), they will run head-on into the rough proportion-
ality standard and burden-shifting from Dolan. In some commu-
nities, "foster[ing] distinctive, attractive communities" (Principle
Five) means preserving scenic vistas and restricting visual clutter
such as billboards and large signs. While aesthetic regulation is
much more acceptable now than in the early years of zoning,61
these post-Euclidean tools also increase the likelihood of a suc-
cessful court challenge brought by frustrated landowners, based
not only on the Takings Clause but on the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech Clause as well.62
Principle Six, "preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty,
and critical environmental areas,"63 is not only the goal most
closely linked to local environmental law, but also the goal that
poses the most serious regulatory takings problems for govern-
ment officials. The lesson of cases such as Nollan, Dolan, Suitum,
Del Monte Dunes, and Palazzolo is clear and sobering: public
amenities, such as greenways, paths, trails, and open spaces con-
taining wetlands and critical habitats, are not there for the people
to obtain through regulations and exactions alone. Unless local
environmental regulators perform their tasks very carefully and
efficiently, there may very well be a price to pay, and that price is
called "just compensation."
While infilling programs that target redevelopment toward
existing urban and older suburban areas (Principle Seven) do not
61. See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization: Commu-
nal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445,
483 (1998) ("Aesthetic zoning has evolved from an impermissible use of police power
to a possible public good.").
62. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (invalidating sign ordi-
nance as a violation of the First Amendment's free speech protections).
63. Getting to Smart Growth, supra note 56, at ii.
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necessarily raise regulatory takings questions, there could be a
problem if a locality uses a greenbelt or urban growth boundary
(UGB) as a means of directing development "inward. '6 4 Landown-
ers who find themselves outside the boundary may catch the
court's attention if they can demonstrate arbitrariness in setting
the line or that their exclusion has caused a severe loss of "eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of [their] land."6 5 Another
tool designed to further infilling-brownfields redevelopment 66-
raises even more significant concerns regarding public health and
environmental justice, as inner-city residents who live near con-
taminated sites are faced with the dilemma of no action or a po-
tentially inadequate cleanup. 67 Therefore, in terms of a generous
judicial reception, the long-term outlook is not bright for many lo-
cal environmental tools.
V. Shedding History
Compounding the problems faced by regulators and their sup-
porters is the dubious history of local environmental law. Too
often, environmental protection and conservation have been a
cloak for exclusion of the poor, minorities, students, and the eld-
erly.68 Large-lot zoning mandates and growth control measures,
which effectively eliminated the possibility of new affordable
housing in many outlying suburbs,6 9 were often defended as sound
conservation strategies.
In an early New Jersey exclusionary zoning case, for example,
the judge was unconvinced when the locality offered the following
reason for its growth control measures: "low population density
zoning provides protection against floods and other surface drain-
age problems and against diversion of water from an aquifer, an
64. The Portland, Oregon metropolitan region features the most famous UGB.
See, e.g., Metro, Urban Growth Boundary, at http://www.metro-region.org/metro/
growth/ugbursa/ugbursa.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2002).
65. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
66. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883.
67. See Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields Recycling
and Federal Enterprise Zoning, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 495, 514-19 (1998).
68. Professor Daniel R. Mandelker addressed this problem in the early 1980s,
with the same sharp insights that have typified his scholarship. See DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (1981).
69. In the 1950s, Professor Charles Haar sounded a warning about suburban zon-
ing's exclusionary potential. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Stan-
dards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1051 (1953). See also CHARLES
M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 15-22 (1998).
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underground water resource."70 The judge's skepticism is palpa-
ble in the following two paragraphs:
Flood or drainage problems were not discussed in the proposed
master plan of May 1970, in no specific detail in the studies of
the previous planning consultant. There was no consideration in
the record of alternative plans, such as retention basins. The
common knowledge that impermeable surfaces, specifically
roofs and streets, increase surface water run-off is insufficient to
support the rezoning of substantially all vacant land in the
township into one and two acre zones. Similarly, whether the
Englishtown aquifer would be imperiled by the development of
the Burnt Fly Bog area is a specialized hydrological subject.
Only engineering data and expert opinion and, it may be, ecolog-
ical data and expert opinion could justify the ordinance under
attack. These were lacking both in the legislative process and at
the trial. The record fails to substantiate that safeguarding
against flood and surface drainage problems and protection of
the Englishtown aquifer would be reasonably advanced by the
sweeping zoning revision into low population density districts
along the four water courses and elsewhere or the exclusionary
limitations on multi-family apartment units.7 1
A similar suspicion about the motives of local officials appears in
the most famous exclusionary zoning case, Southern Burlington
County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel ("Mount Laurel
i,).72
70. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971).
71. Id. at 359.
72. 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). Justice Frederick W. Hall
wrote for the court:
The propriety of zoning ordinance limitations on housing for ecological or
environmental reasons seems also to be suggested by Mount Laurel in
support of the one-half acre minimum lot size in that very considerable
portion of the township still available for residential development. It is
said that the area is without sewer or water utilities and that the soil is
such that this plot size is required for safe individual lot sewage disposal
and water supply. The short answer is that, this being flat land and read-
ily amenable to such utility installations, the township could require
them as improvements by developers or install them under the special
assessment or other appropriate statutory procedure. The present envi-
ronmental situation of the area is, therefore, no sufficient excuse in itself
for limiting housing therein to single-family dwellings on large lots. This
is not to say that land use regulations should not take due account of
ecological or environmental factors or problems. Quite the contrary.
Their importance, at last being recognized, should always be considered.
Id. at 731 (citation omitted).
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Moreover, in one of the most influential cases approving a
New York suburb's innovative growth management program, the
majority felt the need to address (and dismiss) the charge that the
community was engaging in exclusionary practices:
What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is commu-
nity efforts at immunization or exclusion. But, far from being
exclusionary, the present amendments merely seek, by the im-
plementation of sequential development and timed growth, to
provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated to the effi-
cient utilization of land. The restrictions conform to the commu-
nity's considered land use policies as expressed in its
comprehensive plan and represent a bona fide effort to maxi-
mize population density consistent with orderly growth. 73
Judge Breitel disagreed:
It has indeed reflected the larger understanding that American
society is at a critical crossroads in the accommodation of urban-
ization and suburban living, with effects that are no longer con-
fined, bad as they are, to ethnic exclusion or "snob" zoning.
Ramapo would preserve its nature, delightful as that may be,
but the supervening question is whether it alone may decide
this or whether it must be decided by the larger community rep-
resented by the Legislature.74
Furthermore, Judge Breitel, in a somewhat prescient aside,
hinted that this growth management scheme raised constitutional
issues including those "relat[ing] to the power of government to
deprive the landowner of any reasonable use of his land for a pe-
riod of years, up to 18 years, without compensation. 7 5
Today's advocates and practitioners of local environmental
law must take care to purge statutes and ordinances, as well as
their application and enforcement, of this historical taint and to
guard against the very real possibility that a court will find a vio-
lation of the Takings Clause. It is time to turn our attention to
concrete strategies for earning deference.
73. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 302 (N.Y. 1972).
74. Id. at 311 (Breitel, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 309.
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VI. "All I'm Asking Is for a Little Respect"76
This author proposes three strategies, each designed to bring
local environmental law within the shelter of Euclidean deference.
There are, in turn, three reasons local governments, with the as-
sistance of state and federal officials, should pursue these strate-
gies. First, once deference is earned, the presumption will
decidedly shift (or remain) in favor of the local government, mak-
ing it much more likely than not that these environmentally based
restrictions will survive a private property rights-based challenge.
Second, bolstering the constitutional and political legitimacy of lo-
cal environmental law will mean that the Supreme Court may
well slow down its amplification of the confusing and already ex-
pansive regulatory takings doctrine, an amplification that threat-
ens a wide array of "mainstream" federal and state environmental
law. Finally, all three strategies for earning deference include a
public participation element that will potentially allow a large
portion of the public to be invested in the success of the local envi-
ronmental law project.
A. Pay as You Go
A large component of local environmental law consists simply
of the protection of sensitive lands and resources, such as flood-
plains, wetlands, critical habitats, aquifers, ridgelines, scenic
views, streams, and trees from over-development by landowners
and their agents. In the realm of traditional real property law,
concerned parties accomplish this same goal by acquiring a servi-
tude that burdens the estate of the private landowner. The land-
owner whose property is subject to an easement, covenant, or
equitable servitude runs the risk of a damages award or an injunc-
tion forbidding future interference if the landowner conducts ac-
tivities inconsistent with the property rights in the land held by
the servitude owner. 77
The safest way for localities to effectuate these protective
measures is to acquire the fee interest in the targeted land or the
right to stop or punish over-development of that land. Should the
landowner refuse to accept the offer, the locality can then exercise
its power of eminent domain-for environmental protection
76. Aretha Franklin, Respect, on I NEVER LOVED A MAN THE WAY I LOVE You
(Atlantic Records 1967).
77. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 8.1-8.33 (3d ed. 2000).
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should certainly meet the definition of "public use" or "public pur-
pose" as defined by modern courts. 78
We know that local governments are aware of this option be-
cause state-authorized conservation easements are quite popular
devices for accomplishing environmental protection goals. 79 We
also know why local governments would prefer to accomplish the
same results by regulations that do not require a direct expendi-
ture of funds from the public coffer, funds that may require public
approval or even, heaven forbid, a property tax hike. However,
this is just the kind of strategy that gets local environmental regu-
lators in trouble with the judiciary.80
There is an important precedent for pursuing the "pay as you
go" strategy that bears careful study by advocates of local environ-
mental law. In November 1998, New Jersey voters overwhelm-
ingly approved an ambitious plan to borrow one billion dollars
over ten years for the purpose of preserving one million acres of
open space and farmland.' New Jersey citizens now have an
ownership interest, not only in this specific preservation program,
but more importantly in the general notion that the protection of
sensitive lands is good public policy. State and local officials in
other jurisdictions may desire to follow New Jersey's lead, but
may be apprehensive about voter reaction. It is imperative that
the electorate be educated concerning the benefits of this program.
As an alternative, or as an interim approach pending public ap-
proval of direct expenditures, government officials and non-gov-
78. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (attacking
"certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii [was] a legiti-
mate public purpose.").
79. Wyoming is the only state to lack a specific statute authorizing conservation
easements. See RiCHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.01 n.1
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2002).
80. In the most important regulatory takings case that nearly made it to a sub-
stantive decision by the Supreme Court, the locality had actually proposed to the vot-
ers a bond issue in order to raise the funds for acquiring open-space lands that the
municipality had designated in accordance with a state statute. Included among the
open-space lands were fifty acres of a larger parcel upon which an energy company
intended to construct a nuclear power plant. Although the voters turned down the
bond issue, the open-space designation remained in place, giving rise to the company's
regulatory takings challenge. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981) (dismissing landowner's appeal from order of state appellate court that
was not deemed final for jurisdictional reasons).
81. See Jennifer Preston, The 1998 Elections: Around the Region - The Ballot
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at B14. See also Garden State Preservation
Trust Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8C-1 to C-42 (2002); Garden State Preservation
Trust Home Page, at http://www.state.nj.us/gspt (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
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ernmental organizations can continue their efforts to secure
voluntary donations of money and real property interests.8 2
Some will scoff at this suggestion, either because they feel
that the same results can be accomplished by regulation or be-
82. It may also be a good time to experiment with land banking, the perennial
favorite of many in the professional planning community. Several years ago, Profes-
sor Stoebuck conceived of their use in a provocative manner:
[T]he purpose of land banking would be to control the development of new
suburban communities. The land bank would acquire land by negotiation
or, if necessary, by eminent domain, hold the land for some years, and
then sell it mostly to private developers, although it would retain some
land for public facilities. Key to the system would be conditions attached
at the time of sale by contract and restrictive covenants. The land bank
would control use of each parcel of land. Such a system of control would
have a fundamental advantage over traditional police power regulations,
such as zoning. The conditions would operate affirmatively, whereas zon-
ing restrictions are usually negative. Thus, land banking would give more
precise control over community development than traditional regulations.
In particular, land banking would allow precise timing and placement of
land uses to produce a community that would develop efficiently and
harmoniously.
The enormous amounts of money necessary for initial land acquisition
would most likely have to come from the federal government, although
commentators have suggested plans for financing by public bonds. Gov-
ernmental entities engaged in land banking would also incur substantial
costs during the holding period. Because the value of the land would in-
crease during the holding period, profits made upon sale might pay for
the program or even result in a net profit. A certain tension would exist
between the desire to make a profit, which would promote sale of the land
for market-intensive uses, and the ultimate objectives of community plan-
ning, which would support sale of the land for less intensive uses. Consid-
ering the costs and benefits of land banking to all of society, the question
of whether, in strictly economic terms, benefits would exceed costs is un-
clear. Even if costs exceeded benefits, land banking still provides a ser-
vice, good community planning, which, like all services, must be bought
with a price.
William B. Stoebuck, Suburban Land Banking, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 605-06
(1986).
In January 1999, the Clinton Administration included a proposal for Better
America Bonds in its budget request:
The largest single item of new spending in the Administration growth
proposal is a five-year, $700 million program that will allow state and
local governments to issue no-interest "Better America Bonds" to lenders,
who would claim a tax credit for the life of the bond, rather than receive
interest. The money would be used to preserve parks and open spaces,
protect water supplies and develop abandoned industrial sites for com-
mercial use-all vital components to controlled growth.
Mr. Gore said the bonds could leverage as much as $10 billion in invest-
ment around planned growth areas.
Michael Janofsky, Gore Offers Plan to Control Suburban Sprawl, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12,
1999, at A16. The plan was never implemented by legislation.
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cause they are not sanguine about the prospects of securing ap-
proval from parsimonious voters. The reality, however, is that a
judge who is aware that the citizens in some states and localities
(or their elected representatives) have voted to pay to preserve en-
vironmentally sensitive lands will be less sympathetic with, and
less deferential to, state and local officials who choose the regula-
tory path to accomplish the same goal.
B. Getting Back into Uniform
American zoning is truly a federalist creature. While local ac-
tors pass the controlling ordinance and make the day-to-day deci-
sions regarding rezonings, special use permits, and variances,
they do so at the behest of the state legislature, in accordance with
the state enabling act.s 3 Professor Chused recently described the
federal piece of this puzzle:
Herbert Hoover, known most widely for escorting the Great De-
pression into existence, served as Secretary of Commerce under
Presidents Harding and Coolidge from 1921 until his accession
to the presidency in 1928. Among the first things he did after
taking over the department was to create the Division of Build-
ing and Housing in the Bureau of Standards and to appoint
John M. Gries to run it. Gries helped organize a number of ini-
tiatives, all designed to encourage local authorities to alter the
ways they dealt with real estate planning, development and con-
struction. The Better Homes Organization, for example, was
formed to encourage local initiatives for housing construction.
A panel was established to develop a model building code to re-
duce domination by "contractors and labor organizations who
greatly and unnecessarily increased costs." In July of 1921,
Gries, over the signature of his boss Herbert Hoover, began to
invite a number of prominent real estate development and plan-
ning professionals to form a small "committee to consider the
question of zones." The group that emerged was a "who's who"
of the real estate development and planning worlds-Edward
Bassett, Irving B. Hiett, John Ihlder, Morris Knowles, Nelson
Lewis, J. Horace McFarland, Frederick Law Olmsted, and Law-
rence Veiller. The committee devoted itself to gathering infor-
mation about zoning. They published tens of thousands of
copies of a widely read tract called the Zoning Primer, and
crafted a Standard Zoning Enabling Act, a model statute that
83. See, e.g., MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, supra note 59, §§ 4.15-4.16.
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was quickly used by states all across the country to authorize
local government zoning.84
This experiment in model legislation was quite successful, setting
the pattern for American zoning for several decades and, in the
process, lending an air of expertness to local planning and
zoning. s5
Five decades later, the American Law Institute adopted the
Model Land Development Code,86 the product of a second collec-
tion of experts who envisioned a new paradigm that: (1) was much
more sensitive than its predecessor to the dangers development
posed to the environment and (2) defined a greater role for the
states in the planning and zoning process.8 7 It appears now that,
despite its popularity with many professionals in law and plan-
ning, this model act was premature, given the lukewarm reception
it has received in state legislatures.
While the substance of the Model Land Development Code
may not have caught on with lawmakers, the process of drafting a
uniform act can yield many benefits at this time. First, there has
been an impressive amount of experimentation with state land-
use controls and growth management in states such as Florida
(inspired by the Model Land Development Code), Oregon, and
Washington, to name but a few.88 Veterans of battles over legisla-
84. Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597,
598-99 (2001).
85. The most important endorsement of expert involvement can be found in Eu-
clid, 272 U.S. at 394. "The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands
of commissions and experts, and the results of their investigations have been set forth
in comprehensive reports." Id.
86. A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 524 (1976).
87. See Thomas R. McKeon, Comment, State Regulation of Subdivisions: Defin-
ing the Boundary Between State and Local Land Use Jurisdiction in Vermont, Maine,
and Florida, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385 (1991). McKeon writes:
The Model Code, while maintaining local government as the primary ar-
biter of local land use issues, also created a role for the states. The draft-
ers of the Code envisioned a state-supervised approval process for any
development with the potential to have impacts beyond the particular lo-
cality that otherwise would have regulatory responsibility for the devel-
opment. Exercising power through a state adjudicatory board, the state
would review any development within "area [s] of critical state concern" or
"development of regional impact" (DRI). To enable a state agency to de-
fine a DRI,. the Code proposed a set of criteria. State regulation of subdi-
visions under the Model Code would occur when a subdivision fit the
definition of a DRI.
Id. at 409-10.
88. See, e.g., James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The
Emerging New Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L.
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tion, implementation, and enforcement from these states can pro-
vide invaluable input for the new draft.
Second, the Supreme Court's regulatory takings activism-
particularly the Court's skepticism regarding environmental
goals, the requirement for "rough proportionality," 9 and the shift
of burden to the public side-has created a new reality for govern-
ment regulators. 90 By participating in a national uniform law ef-
fort that yields an effective work product, local and state officials
can make headway toward winning back the respect and defer-
ence of fair-minded judges.
Third, by including representatives of the building industry,
real estate agents, the environmental remediation industry, pri-
vate property rights advocates, community activists, and elected
officials from states with reputations both friendly and not-so-
friendly to environmental controls on land use and development,
there is a serious opportunity to carve out a new consensus amid
the current chaos. The natural hosts for a nationwide effort of
this kind would be the two federal agencies with the most experi-
ence and expertise in environmental regulation and land-use
planning-the EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD).
As an interim measure, until momentum grows for a new uni-
form law effort, HUD and EPA should enhance their clearing-
house and support functions. 91 Local environmental regulators
are in great need of information regarding "best practices" by their
counterparts in other jurisdictions. National internships, training
sessions, fellowships, and awards programs should be established
and, where they exist already, expanded to bring as many state
and local actors closer to the information and the skills they need
in order to make informed decisions regarding granting permits
and exemptions, enforcing laws on the books, enacting new stat-
utes and regulations, and coordinating efforts on the regional and
state level. In these ways, the federal government can recapture
REV. 489 (1994). The title refers, of course, to the most influential, seminal study of
state and regional land-use planning. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
89. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 .
90. Another aspect of the "new takings" reality is the growing popularity of state
takings statutes. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise
of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187 (1997).
91. See, e.g., EPA SMART GROWTH, supra note 58; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING &
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, WHAT WORKS IN COMMUNITIES, at http://www.hud.gov/what
works/index.cfm (last updated Apr. 22, 2002).
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the key role it played eight decades ago at the infancy of the Amer-
ican zoning and planning movement.
C. Stopping to Think (Locally)
More than thirty years ago, federal environmental law was
revolutionized by a seemingly simple statute that appeared to re-
quire very little of federal agencies-the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).92 In the hands of activist judges, led
by the legendary J. Skelley Wright, NEPA quickly shed its "paper
tiger" image.93 By the mid-1970s, NEPA was widely understood
to mandate federal agencies to "stop and think"94 carefully and
expansively about the implications of "major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment," 95 and,
perhaps, to engage in time and resource-consuming studies of
those wide-ranging implications.96 As a result, the Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (EIS) process triggered by NEPA, and by
state versions in several jurisdictions, 97 has become a focal point
for active public participation and, at times, lawsuits orchestrated
by federal, state, and local non-governmental organizations.
The process of making and enforcing local environmental law
could benefit from the adoption of four NEPA elements. First, at
the proposal stage for a new environmental regulation device or
program, local regulators could do an initial analysis concerning
whether the implementation of that device or program would "sig-
nificantly affect the market value of private property within the
jurisdiction."98 While it is hard to imagine any land-use or envi-
ronmental regulation that does not have some negative effect on
property values, the impact of some measures can be quite dra-
matic. The first stage would identify those "high-impact" devices
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000).
93. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (writing for the court, Judge Wright stated, "Congress did not intend the Act to
be such a paper tiger.").
94. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 612 (2d ed. 1998).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
96. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 9.1-9.9 (2d
ed. 1994).
97. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and
Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 58 n.364 (1998) (citations to state envi-
ronmental policy acts (SEPAs)).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ("[M]ajor Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment .... ).
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or programs that are most likely to raise serious property rights
concerns.
Should the answer to the first inquiry be "yes," local officials
would then "consult with and obtain the comments of any federal,
local or state agency or governmental unit that has special exper-
tise with respect to the type of proposed regulation." 99 In this sec-
ond, consultative step, local officials would receive the counsel of
those who have access to information regarding (1) actual exper-
iences with the operation of the proposed or closely related devices
or programs and (2) ways to mitigate the negative impact on prop-
erty values while maintaining the essential environmental char-
acter of the proposed tool.
During the next step, local officials would, in a document
made available for public comment, explain the proposed measure
and any feedback received during the consultative step, and "ob-
jectively evaluate reasonable alternatives to the proposed device
or program in a document that is made available for public com-
ment."100 Local governments, like all lawmakers, often govern
least effectively when they quickly respond to perceived emergen-
cies. Moreover, local land-use regulation has always been associ-
ated with suspicions of graft and corruption that, regrettably, are
sometimes warranted.
A common concern voiced by judges in modern regulatory tak-
ings cases is that one or a few landowners may be unfairly singled
out to bear heavy burdens for the benefit of the wider community.
Requiring local environmental regulators to report their plans,
findings, and evaluations of reasonable alternatives to the public
would be an effective step toward reducing the perception and re-
ality of corruption, favoritism, and bias. By inviting public com-
ments, government officials will be able to consider arguments
and alternatives offered by private property owners and their ad-
vocates, and by interest groups favoring real estate development,
in a non-confrontational setting removed from the pressures and
expenses of litigation.
The fourth step, before implementation of the device or pro-
gram, would be the production of a document that responds to the
public comments received as a result of the third step. In this fi-
99. Id. ("[Riesponsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments
of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect
to any environmental impact involved.").
100. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) ("Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all rea-
sonable alternatives.").
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nal stage, local government officials will have the opportunity to
make some private parties stakeholders in the final product that
emerges from the regulatory process. Should landowners chal-
lenge the implemented program or device in court on regulatory
takings grounds, the judge might very well look askance at plain-
tiffs who failed to participate in this "stop and think" process, or
who allege that the local government acted hastily or arbitrarily.
VII. In Good Company
State and local environmental regulators are not the only
Rodney Dangerfields who cannot get enough respect in the esti-
mation of the current Supreme Court. Even the work product of
Congress has been treated skeptically by a majority of Justices
who are making a body of new, non-deferential law the likes of
which have not been seen since before "the switch in time that
saved nine"101 during the New Deal.
In their provocative article concerning the new demands
placed on Congress, Professors Buzbee and Schapiro observe:
"[s]ince 1995, the Court's review of the predicate for congressional
legislation has assumed a less deferential cast. In reviewing chal-
lenges to legislation based upon the Commerce Clause and Recon-
struction Amendment Enforcement Clauses, the Court has
embraced an increasingly rigorous mode of legislative record re-
view."10 2 These authors identify this new form of scrutiny as a
"new and intensive skeptical review of legislative materials."10 3
Buzbee and Schapiro's assertion that "applying ... suspicion to
the legislative process represents an unjustified and unworkable
judicial arrogation of legislative authority"10 4 is right on point
and, stripped of its federalism context and implications, serves as
a useful analogy for the Court's treatment of efforts of state and
101. See Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV.
620, 623 n.l1 (1994) (speculating on the origins of this now-famous phrase).
102. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 109. See also Bd. of Treasurers v. Gar-
rett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that in enacting Title I of the American Disabilities
Act, Congress exceeded its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Fla. Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (hold-
ing Congress did not meet its burden of demonstrating that states were engaging in
age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding Congress exceeded its powers under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting portions of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause power in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
103. Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 4, at 89.
104. Id. at 91.
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local environmental regulators. Still, the considerable force of
their logic unfortunately is unlikely to sway a majority of the
Court as it is currently composed.
The challenge facing advocates and practitioners of local envi-
ronmental law is to shape and pursue an action strategy that will
enable progress to continue even in the current, non-deferential
judicial milieu. Paying as they go, getting back into uniform and
stopping to think (locally) are your humble author's suggestions
comprising such a strategy. Let us hope that this symposium will
be the first step toward enabling local environmental law to earn
the deference it needs in order to survive and thrive for the public
good.
